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Cloud Computing: A Paradigm Shift
 Holistic system (social) view is passé
 Tenants make resource acquisition decisions; no 
incentive to be fair or friendly to others
 IaaS providers have no incentive to minimize 
tenant costs; they only react to market pressure
 Challenge is to design the mechanisms that 
engender trust in the cloud marketplace
 Marketplace mechanisms
 Fixed pricing for reserved resources 
 Fixed pricing for shared resources 
 Dynamic pricing for reserved resources
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Fixed pricing for exclusive resources
“Pricing is per instance-hour 
consumed for each instance type. 
Partial instance-hours consumed 
are billed as full hours.”
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Marketplace Implications?
08:00 am / Amazon  $3 09:00 am / Amazon  $3
10:00 am / Amazon  $2 11:00 am / Amazon  $2
Hosts
Tasks
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(Cloud) Colocation Games
 IaaS cloud providers offer fixed-sized 
instances for a fixed price
 Provider’s profit = number of instances 
sold; no incentive to colocate customers
 Virtualization enables colocation to 
reduce costs without QoS compromises
 Customers’ selfishness reduces the 
colocation process to a strategic game
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Colocation Games: Questions
 Does it reach equilibrium?
 If so, how fast? 
 If so, at what price (of anarchy)?
 How about multi-resource jobs/hosts?
 How about multi-job tasks?
 How about job/host dependencies?
 How could it be implemented?
 How would it perform in practice?
 …
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Colocation Game: Model 
 A hosting graph G =(V,E) 
 V & E labeled by capacity vector R and fixed price P
 Workloads as task graphs Ti =(Vi,Ei) 
 Vi & Ei labeled by a utilization vector W
 Valid mappings
 Vi  V & Ei  E: Σ W ≤ R ; supply meets demand
 Shapley Cost function
 Cost P of a resource is split among workloads 
mapped to it in proportion to use
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The General Colocation Game (GCG)
 GCG is a pure strategies game: 
Each workload is able to make a (better 
response) “move” from a valid mapping M into 
another M′ so as to minimize its own cost
 Example applications:
 Overlay reservation, e.g., on PlanetLab
 CDN colocation, e.g., on CloudFront
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General Colocation Game: Properties 
 GCG may not converge to 
a Nash equilibrium
 Theorem: 
Determining whether a GCG has a 
Nash Equilibrium is NP-Complete 
(by reduction to 3-SAT problem)
 Need more structure to 
ensure convergence
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Colocation Games: Variants
 Process Colocation Game (PCG):
Each workload consists of a single vertex (process) 
that needs to be assigned to a single host with only 
one capacitated resource
 Multidimensional PCG (MPCG):
Same as PCG but with multi-capacitated resources
 Example applications:
 VM colocation, e.g., on a Eucalyptus cluster
 Streaming server colocation
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Colocation Games: Variants
 Parallel PCG (PPCG):
Task graph consists of a set of disconnected 
vertices (independent processes), each with 
multidimensional resource utilization needs
 Uniform PPCG:
Same as PPCG but with identical resource 
utilization for all processes
 Example applications:
 Map-Reduce paradigm
 MPI scientific computing paradigm
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Colocation Games: Theoretical results
 PCG converges to a Nash Equilibrium under 
better-response dynamics
 PCG converges to a Nash Equilibrium in O(n2)
better-response moves, where n = |V| 
 Price of Anarchy for PCG is 3/2 when hosting 
graph is homogeneous and 2 otherwise
 MPCG converges to a Nash equilibrium under 
better-response dynamics
 Uniform PPCG converges to a Nash equilibrium 
under better-response dynamics
 …
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PCG: Better Response
Best-Response moves require knowledge of 
utilizations of all processes – not practical 
Local Better-Response solution:
1. Select a random target hosting node and obtain process 
utilizations of all processes on that node
2. Determine if a cost-reducing “legal” move to that node is 
possible – an NP-hard Knapsack problem 
 Dynamic Programming solution in pseudo-polynomial time 
for small number (100s) of processes/host [DPKP] 
 Breadth-First branch & bound Search heuristic [BFS] 
 Depth-First branch & bound Search heuristic [DFS] 
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PCG: Performance Evaluation
Workloads
 Trace-driven: CoMon PlanetLab Traces
 Real hosting environment with 3-dimensional resource utilizations
 Infeasible to compute optimal colocation
 Synthetic: Perfectly Packable 
 Allows systematic exploration of the space
 Optimal colocation is known by construction
Metrics (over 100 experiments)
 Colocation Ratio (bounded by PoA)
 How inefficient is the resulting colocation compared to optimal or best? 
 Number of moves (not migrations) until NE is reached
 How much churn (overhead) to be expected?
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PCG: Synthetic baseline results
Number of processes Number of processes
Median(Colocation Ratio) Median(Number of Moves)
1-D Synthetic Workload
PoA    
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MPCG: PlanetLab baseline results
Number of processes Number of processes
Median(Colocation Ratio) Median(Number of Moves)
3-D PlanetLab Workload
A. Bestavros -- Mechanisms for Efficient Cloud Markets @ RIT
512/18/2012
MPCG: Colocation Ratio
Number of processes Number of processes
Median(Worst/Optimal) Median(Worst/Best)
3-D Synthetic Workload 3-D PlanetLab Workload
A. Bestavros -- Mechanisms for Efficient Cloud Markets @ RIT 12/18/2012
MPCG: Number of Moves
Number of processes Number of processes
Median(Number of Moves) Median(Number of Moves)
3-D Synthetic Workload 3-D PlanetLab Workload
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The CLOUDCOMMONS prototype
 API for Strategic Services
To facilitate colocation, e.g., allow users to find 
each other, compute strategic responses, …
 API for Operational Services
To enforce outcomes of colocation, e.g., 
migration, reconfiguration, accounting, …
 Implementation over Xen
Xen Colocation Services (XCS) 
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CLOUDCOMMONS: XCS Architecture
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CLOUDCOMMONS: Migration Service
 Identify VMs to migrate
 Minimize number of migrations
 Minimize amount of data that needs to move
 Determine migration plan
 Exploit potential for parallelism
 Minimize need for staging hosts
 Evaluate impact of migration
 On performance of the migrating VMs
 On performance of non-migrating VMs
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Need for staging hosts
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A temporary (staging) host is needed to swap VM2 and VM4
A. Bestavros -- Mechanisms for Efficient Cloud Markets @ RIT
Need for a migration plan
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Data/User Transfer Minimization
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Theorem: The DTM (UTM) heuristic results in at most twice the 
amount of data transfer (migrations) incurred by an optimal 
algorithm.
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7Impact on TPC-W from migration
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Migrating VM Migrating VM
Non-Migrating VM Non-Migrating VM
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CLOUDCOMMONS: Benefit to users
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Planet-Lab trace-driven experiments
(Overheads/costs of all XCS services included)
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CLOUDCOMMONS: Benefit to Customers
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Planet-Lab trace-driven experiments
(Overheads/costs of all XCS services included)
50% of 
customers 
save more 
than 68%
At most 7% 
of customers 
overpay less 
than 1%
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How do we depart from prior work?
 Cooperative cost-sharing games†‡#
 Find coalition where nobody gains by leaving
 Computationally hard
 Applied to best-effort routing problems
 Player cost not use based; unjustifiable 
† V. Misra, S. Ioannidis, A. Chaintreau, and L. Massoulié. Incentivizing Peer-Assisted
Services: A Fluid Shapley Value Approach. In SIGMETRICS 2010.
‡ H. Chen and T. Roughgarden, T. Network design with weighted players. In SPAA 2006. 
# E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, J. Kleinberg, E. Tardos, T. Wexler, and T. Roughgarden.
The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation. In FOCS 2004.
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8Fixed pricing for shared resources
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The perils of the fixed pricing model
 It’s here to stay; metered pricing rejected
 Implications:
 Customer has no incentive to save bandwidth
 ISP cost depends on peak demand – 95/5 rule 
 Reigning in bandwidth hogs is incompatible with 
Net Neutrality
 Must devise mechanisms that take ISPs out 
of the “traffic shaping” business
30
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DSLAM “last-mile” architecture
Traffic shaping done at BRAS   
Broadband Remote
Access Server
DSL Access
Multiplexer
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Solution: Create a marketplace
 Recognize the two types of user utilities:
 Interactive Traffic (IT)
 Browsing, VoIP, Video, Messaging, Gaming, …
 Limited bandwidth; highly sensitive to response time
 Fluid Traffic (FT)
 P2P, Network backup, Netflix/software downloads, … 
 Open-ended bandwidth; less sensitive to response time 
 Create a marketplace:
1. Give users rights to DSLAM bandwidth, and
2. Let users trade IT & FT allocations over time
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The Marketplace
 Each user gets a fixed budget per epoch
 Budget (Bi) proportional to level of service 
 An epoch is a fixed number of time-slots, 
e.g., 1 day = 288 5-min slots
 Trade & Cap
 User engages in a pure strategies game that 
yields a schedule for its IT sessions
 User acquires as much FT bandwidth as its 
remaining budget would allow
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Trading Phase: Strategy Space
 Session: 
An IT session is the sequence of slots during which an IT 
application is active
 Slack: 
User may have flexibility in scheduling IT sessions; slack 
specifies the number of slots that an IT session is allowed to 
be shifted back/forth
 Strategy Space:
The set of all possible arrangements of IT sessions within 
allowable slack define the strategy space for a user
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Trading Phase: Cost Function
 Let xik be the bandwidth used in slot k by 
a chosen IT session schedule for user i.
 The cost incurred by user i is given by:
 Cost of user i depends on the choices 
made by other users – hence the game!
 
  





slotsk usersj
jkik
slotsk
kiki xxUxc
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Trading Phase: Illustration
Cost(User 2) = 2*2 + 1*2 = 6
36
User 1 User 1
User 2 User 2
Up 2 2 20 0 01 1
10
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Trading Phase: Illustration
Cost(User 2) = 1*2 + 1*1 + 1*1 = 4
User 1 User 1
User 2 User 2
Up 1 2 11 0 11 1
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Trading Phase: Best Response
 BR of user i is the schedule of IT sessions 
that minimizes its cost ci 
 Computing BR is NP-hard, equivalent to 
solving a generalized knapsack problem
 Dynamic programming solution is 
pseudo-polynomial in the product of the 
number of sessions and number of slots
 Scales well for all practical settings –
100s of users and 100s of slots 
38
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Trading Phase: Findings
 Provably converges to Nash Equilibrium, 
even in presence of constraints
 For n users, Price of Anarchy is n, but in 
practice below 2, especially for n>10
 Experimentally, large reduction of peak 
utilization, even with small flexibility
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Capping Phase: Best Response
 BR of user i is to maximize total FT 
allocation
subject to the budget constraint



slotsk
iki ww
ii
slotsk usersj
jkik cBwUw 


  
 
0
11
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Capping Phase: Budget
 Let V be an upper-bound on traffic per slot
 The ISP sets a target capacity C = V/R, 
where R ≥ 1 reflects its “resistance” to traffic 
 The ISP allocates C in some proportion 
(e.g., equally) to all n users over all slots
 This constitutes the budget B assigned to a 
user over an epoch T
T
n
CB 
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Capping Phase: Findings
 Computing BR is efficient using Lagrange 
Multipliers method
 Provably, converges to a unique global 
(social) optimum that maximizes the FT 
allocations of all users
 Experimentally, smoothes the aggregate 
IT+FT traffic to any desirable level 
controlled by a “resistance parameter” R
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Trade & Cap: Implementation
 On Client Side (e.g., DSL Modem): 
+ Strategic agent to execute Trade & Cap
+ Operational service to profile, classify, and shape
 ISP Side (e.g., DSLAM or BRAS):
+ Support exchange between strategic agents
+ Enforce total traffic/slot/user from Trade & Cap
Interactive traffic
Bulk traffic
Trade & Cap: Implementation
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Linux BoxesTrace-driven
workload
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Trade & Cap: Implementation notes
 User Input:
 As simple as checking box to join marketplace, 
and as elaborate as micromanaging RT slacks
 May set a fraction of “budget” as insurance
 Client-side Profiler:
 May be explicitly controlled by applications (or 
user settings)
 Client-side Traffic Shaper:
 Work-conserving (not reservation based) Linux 
Hierarchical Token Bucket (HTB) 
 Allows FT to use underutilized RT bandwidth
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Experimental Evaluation
Workload
Derived from WAN traces 
of MAWI project
 Identify users from volume 
and direction of flows to 
known ports (e.g., most 
traffic destined to port 80)
 Identify user IT sessions 
using thresholds on per-IP 
traffic intensities over time
 Slack introduced using 
various models (e.g., fixed,  
proportional, etc.) 
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Trading Phase: Experimental PoA
Theoretical PoA is n but not in practice
Over 5 slots Over 10 slots
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Trading Phase: Smoothing effect
Value proposition to ISPs
Max 
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Trade & Cap: Flexibility pays off!
Value proposition to customers
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Trade & Cap
A win-win for ISPs and customers
Time Slot
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Trade & Cap: Beyond DSLAMs
 Trade & Cap is a general mechanism
It can be used to coordinate how a shared resource 
is used by selfish parties who are not subject to 
the “pay as you go” model – e.g., “fixed pricing”
 Examples
 Coordinating consumption of “reserved” versus “fluid” 
(CPU/network) capacities of VMs sharing a single host
 Coordinating “reserved” versus “fluid” bandwidth 
utilization by multiple ISP customers (e.g., enterprises)
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Fixed Pricing: Alternatives?
 Vickrey-style auctions work†
 Assumes supply < demand 
 Takes a social perspective 
 Offers a strategy-proof solution
 Requires central authority
 Susceptible to collusion
† A. Young, B. Chun, A. Snoeren, and A. Vahdat. Resource allocation in federated
distributed computing infrastructures. In OS/architectural support for on-demand IT
infrastructure, 2004.
A. Bestavros -- Mechanisms for Efficient Cloud Markets @ RIT
14
Dynamic pricing: Better mechanism?
 Customer cost should be a function of 
supply and demand
 Supply may vary over time
 Supplier’s cost may vary over time
 Demand may vary over time
 Demand may exhibit structure, and may be 
subject to malleable constraints
 Need language to specify supply and 
demand (and act as basis for SLAs) 
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Resource Supply/Demand Model
 Supply/demand SLA types: ሺܥ, ܶ, ܦ,ܹሻ
 ܥ ~ amount available or consumed
 ܶ ~ allocation period
 ܦ ~ tolerable number of missed allocations in ܹ
 ܹ ~ window of >= 1 allocation intervals 
 Examples
 SLA type ሺ2,5,0,1ሻ
2 resource units supplied/consumed every 5 seconds 
with no missed allocations allowed
 SLA type ሺ3,30,2,5ሻ
3 resource units supplied/consumed every 30 seconds 
with no more than 2 out of 5 missed allocations
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SLA Calculus
 Models various patterns of allocation and 
consumption (e.g., RR, GPS, LB, …)
 SLA types define type hierarchies
 ሺ1, ܰ, 0,1ሻ 	൏ 	 ሺ݇, ݇ ∗ ܰ, 0,1ሻ
 ሺܥ, ܶ, ܦ,ܹሻ 	൏ 	 ሺܥ, ܶ, ܦ’,ܹሻ, if	ܦ ൏ ܦ’
 …
 Possible to transform SLAs from one 
form to another (safer) form
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Using SLA Calculus for Colocation 
 Not possible 
to colocate
 Possible to 
colocate
 SLA types and calculus provide a notion of 
supply & demand elasticity  
Job 1 Job 2 Job 3 Job 4 Job 5
C 1 2 3 4 5
T 4 9 17 34 67
Job 1 Job 2 Job 3 Job 4 Job 5
C 1 2 3 4 5
T 4 8 16 32 64
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Morphing SLAs for Efficiency
MorphoSys
Demand
Types
{R}
Supply
Types
{S}
{S’}  {R’}
12/18/2012 A. Bestavros -- Mechanisms for Efficient Cloud Markets @ RIT
MorphoSys: Success Rate
Overload Percentage
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MorphoSys: Co-location Efficiency
Number of Hosts Without SLA Transformations
(Average SLA utilization = C/T = 50%)
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MorphoSys: Performance  
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Morph Once @ Arrival
Morph Co-Tenants
Allow Relocation
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Beyond Simple Types
 A workload is a set of requests (tasks), 
each with its SLA, subject to constraints:
 Temporal dependencies between tasks
 Start and end times
 Flexibilities might exist; another source 
of elasticity:
 Min and max delays between tasks
 Deadline slacks
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Workload = DAG of SLA types
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The Customer’s Perspective
 Why should customers expose the 
elasticity of their workloads?
 Current IaaS (fixed) pricing mechanisms 
do not provide proper incentives
 Implications:
 Less efficient workload management
 Customers (should) game the marketplace  
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Dynamic Pricing: Shapley Value
 Well defined concept for fair cost sharing 
from coalitional game theory
 Marginal contribution to the total cost, averaged 
over every permutation, e.g., for 3 workloads
ݏ ݓଵ ൌ
1
6
2 ܿ wଵ ൅ ܿ wଶwଵ െ ܿሺwଶሻ ൅ ܿ wଷwଵ െ ܿሺwଷሻ ൅
ܿ wଶwଷwଵ െ ܿሺwଶwଷሻ ൅ ܿ wଷwଶwଵ െ ܿሺwଷwଶሻ
 Impractical to calculate
 Estimate by sampling random permutations
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Workload Elasticity = Savings
12/18/2012
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Workload Elasticity = Savings
12/18/2012
Variability in Energy Cost
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CLOUDCOMMONS: http://csr.bu.edu/cc
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Supported by a NSF Large CyberTrust Award (in collaboration with Brown and UCI)
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Public clouds are “closed” & prescriptive
 Stock hardware (hard to justify GPUs or a BlueGene)
 Special computational models (MapReduce, or?)
 Operational data is not visible (limits innovation)
 Irrational economic models (why fixed pricing?)
 Designed to lock in customers
 Perform poorly on HPC and big data
 Not conducive to federation of data assets
 Security by obscurity
Not conducive to experimentation/innovation
Problem with today’s cloud solutions
12/18/2012 A. Bestavros -- Mechanisms for Efficient Cloud Markets @ RIT
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Need an ecosystem for
 Infrastructure Providers
EMC, IBM, Dell, NTAP, Cisco, Intel, AMD, …
 Software Platforms 
VMware, RedHat, Hadoop, Azure, MapReduce…
 Aggregators and Resellers
XCS, Morphosys, CloudPack, …
 Customers
HPC apps, Web apps, Enterprise, Gov, …
Can we change this status quo?
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Open Cloud: A Paradigm Shift
 Multiple implementation 
and operational models
 Competing platforms suited 
to HPC, big data, … 
 Open economic model to 
create an efficient market
 Operational data visible to 
various stakeholders 
 Ecosystem needs a 
facility for “mashups”
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Massachusetts Green HPC Facility
Ribbon cutting: November 2012
Operational by: February 2013
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A non‐profit created to operate an open public 
cloud, with access to 10MW of MGHPCC capacity
 Dedicated user community from BU, Harvard, MIT, NEU 
& UMass, large startup community
 Rich regional ecosystem, of vendors and customers in 
specialized domains (big data, HPC, biotech, ...)
 Serves as a repository/infrastructure for regional 
data/big‐data applications
 Significant vendor interest: EMC, Red Hat, IBM, Netapp, 
MSFT, Intel, AMD, …
 Strong state support and backing
The Massachusetts Open Cloud
12/18/2012 A. Bestavros -- Mechanisms for Efficient Cloud Markets @ RIT
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An initiative of The BU Hariri Institute for 
Computing in collaboration with MGHPCC
 Project is spearheaded by Center for Cloud 
Innovations (Orran Krieger, Director)
 Project leverages three Institute research 
priorities: Cybersecurity, Big Data, and Cloud 
Computing 
A great vehicle for international collaboration
 Federation interest from GTech, CMU, Brazil, …
The Massachusetts Open Cloud
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Conclusion
 Resource management must be seen in an 
economics context
 By setting up the right mechanisms, one 
can engender trust in the cloud marketplace
 Supply elasticity meets demand elasticity 
for an efficient marketplace 
 New services needed to support strategic 
and operational aspects of new mechanisms
 Need to experiment at scale! 
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